



Europäische Akademie

zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen
Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH

Direktor:
Professor Dr. Carl Friedrich Gethmann

Newsletter

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Editorial

On February 25th the Council (Kollegium) of the Europäische Akademie convened. The Council brings together the members of the Akademie's project groups and is aimed as a forum for discussing topics of general importance for the scientific community. Due to the recent debate concerning the research on human embryos in Germany, the subject of this meeting was "Science and Scientists in the Media".

The Europäische Akademie had invited several science journalists to reflect on the aims and scope of science journalism. The participating journalists were: Patrick Banners and Joachim Müller-Jung, both *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Dr. Helmut Scheidgen, *Saarländischer Rundfunk*, and Martin Urban, *Süd-deutsche Zeitung*. The discussion following the journalists' statements made it all too clear that there are widely differing views on the proper role of science journalism. Where, to give one example, the scientists present claimed that a correct and intelligible transferring of reliable scientific progress should be the predominant aim of science journalists, the latter insisted that science journalism is first of all journalism – therefore, the potential to arouse interest and not its status as a well-founded scientific news may sometimes determine whether a certain piece of (half-)scientific news is printed. This debate, partly led passionately, showed that there are many misunderstandings concerning the proper role of science-journalism for promoting and controlling science between the professions; misunderstandings that should be – and as far as the Europäische Akademie is concerned – debated further.

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Focus

Slippery Slope Arguments in Bioethical Debates

Georg Kamp

It is often claimed that legalising certain types of advanced research in the life sciences or the application of its results would lead on a slippery slope that ends in horrible scenarios. Therefore, so it is argued, such research or applications better should not be legalised, even though – apart from these horrible effects – they might be acceptable or even desirable from a moral point of view. Arguments of this type, so-called slippery slope arguments, are often rejected for pure logical reasons. – The question as to whether such arguments are conclusive is answered by a methodological advice: If you ask for the soundness of the argument because you want to know whether you should obey its normative conclusion, it will be helpful to supplement all premises that will make it a logically sound. This will unfold all the presuppositions that would, if accepted, make the arguer's recommendation worth obeying. Among these presuppositions there are always some consequentialist principle and a prognosis on the consequences of the action in question. Since these predicted consequences are in themselves actions influenceable by legislation, slippery slope arguments have foremost a heuristic function as part of a "norm-effect assessment" that aims at an optimised legislative norm-formulation.

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) are omnipresent in the debates on how to deal with technological and scientific advances, and are especially often used in the area of bioethics. Three examples illustrate this: (i) It is argued that legalising the cloning of human embryonic stem cells for therapeutic means will be one step one slippery slope that will inevitably lead to full human cloning, and because this was evidently unacceptable the legislative should refrain from the very first step. (ii) It is argued that to allow physicians the painless killing of terminally ill people in order to end their sufferings according to their autonomous explicit demand would lead in the long run lead to a society where physicians are urged to end the lives of people incapable to contribute to the community's value simply because they are a burden to its welfare system. Therefore, each kind of euthanasia should be categorically prohibited, however comprehensible the reasons would be in the individual case, otherwise society could slip down this slippery slope. (iii) It is argued that if we allow some expectant parents (e.g. those that underwent the procedures of an in-vitro fertilisation) to choose some of their baby's characteristics

(e.g. that it doesn't develop muscoviscidose disease), future societies could not resist the pressure to allow all parents to choose each influenceable characteristics of their babies. Since such an inflation of designer babies would not be acceptable, we ought to stay away from the slippery slope and better disallow the parents' exertion of influence, even if that would be deemed desirable in individual cases.

Slippery Slope Arguments as Arguments

It is disputed whether such SSAs are logically sound or not – and the dispute is not the least complicated due to the fact that there is not *the one* type of argument that deserves to be called *the* SSA, rather there are some members of a family that share some, but not all (logical) features, as the few examples already illustrate. Some authors call these members by different names, chosen with concern to different metaphors as e.g. the domino-argument, the wedge-argument or – as is for instance the most usual metaphor in German or French – the argument from the "bursting of a dam".

Indeed, asked for the logical soundness of such ordinary language presentations of

these arguments, the answer is 'no' if we measure them with the requirements of a conceptual explicit deduction that meets the requirements of so-called formal logic – and this they share with most of ordinary language argumentations, even those presented by well-trained logicians. However, what is of interest in the first place is whether we should obey the recommendation the author of a SSA connects with his conclusion, since usually SSAs are contributions to a debate on what ought to be done or better be omitted. So the question of the soundness of these arguments should be seen as the means to this purpose: If we hold that our decision on what has to be done should depend (possibly among other things) on reasoning and hence, the soundness of arguments and the acceptability of reasons given, we should ask whether there is a reconstruction of such arguments that meets its author's intentions on the one side (what he wanted to convince us of) and our requirements on inferential soundness and for consenting to the premises (what we require for being convinced). Now some may sometimes be satisfied by finding an argument just intuitively convincing as it is – and how and by what means two agents organise their interaction must not be of interest to others as long as there are no consequences for any third party. But in those cases which are cited in the examples given above where matters of common interest are affected, the standards of an inferential soundness and material adequacy of used premises meet stronger requirements and some effort in a conceptually explicit reconstruction.

Here a more or less formal logical approach can do good work to enlighten the premises one is bound to accept, if he accepts the conclusion of the argument: Whether one reports 'Dr. A gave him a pill and Dr. B gave him an injection' or 'Dr. B gave him an injection and Dr. A gave him a pill' would usually make no difference at all – and just this irrelevance of order (its commutativity) is the essential *structural* feature of the logical 'and', besides the *inferential* feature that makes us expect that the person who argues for one of these (complex) propositions would also be willing to argue for 'Dr. A gave him a pill' as well as for 'Dr. B gave him an injection'; and the person who argues for both of these (elementary) propositions would also accept the complex one connected by 'and'. In the same way the person who reports 'Dr. B gave me an injection and I was cured', is expected to be willing to assert both parts of this connected proposition, but presumably he wouldn't be willing to assert 'I was cured and Dr. B gave me an injection'. The way both parts of the complex proposition are connected insinuates at least a temporal order and, more than that, we normally would understand it as the report of two events causally related: He was cured *because* Dr. B gave him an injection. Since the conjunction 'and' is the same in both examples, this surplus in meaning must be due to the meaning of the propositions connected by it or by any presupposition about the surrounding in which we expect propositions like this being used. However, regulating the

usage of 'and' so that it is reduced to certain structural and inferential features urges the speaker to name explicitly the semantic surplus that inhibits the commutativity of the connected propositions: 'He was cured at t_1 and Dr. B gave him an injection at t_0 and the injection was (one of) the substantial cause(s) for his being cured'. This pressure to make explicit each relevant aspect of what we are talking about is one of the main tasks of what we call logical reconstruction. Now, if we try to find out by argumentative means what ought to be done and if long-term effects which are typically cited in SSAs are hold as relevant for our decisions, then we should not simply reject their ordinary language formulations as not logically sound but make serious efforts to find out whether there are explicit reconstructions of these arguments possible that deserve to be called sound arguments. If there are, we will be able to have a closer look at each presupposition that has to be accepted by those who want us to accept the normative conclusion of the argument in the form of an explicitly noted and semantically determined premise.

Slippery Slope Arguments as Consequentialistic Arguments

In consequentialistic arguments individual actions or whole types of action are morally qualified with respect to some of its consequences. Most generally those arguments are of the form "Assume action A was performed. Then (directly, in the long run or as a side effect) an event E (or a state S) would occur as a consequence of performing A. Since the occurrence of E (or S) is unacceptable (alternatively: morally intolerable, horrible, ...), and actions with unacceptable (morally intolerable, horrible ...) consequences ought not to be performed, action A ought not to be performed".

Evidently SSAs are variants of this type of argument: They are typically arguments *against* certain planned or considered actions due to their consequences. A closer look at numbers of examples from the area of ethics of science or technology assessment shows that the actions in question are foremost regulative (speech-) acts of permitting certain new or up to now forbidden or even tabooed practices, e.g. the *legalisation* of research on embryos or the *permission* to apply certain results of advanced research as for example the technique of stem cell cloning. So those arguments may be characterised as contributions to the assessment of effects regulative respectively legislative (speech-) acts may have or, in short, to norm-effect-assessment. Incidentally: Consequentially one cannot use SSAs for this reason on the one hand and on the other hand argue against consequentialistic reasoning or consequentialism in ethics throughout. Whoever argues by the slippery slope is inevitably bound to use consequentialistic principles as essential premises.

Beside those principles other premises are to be used in each of those arguments that introduces the relation between the action in question and its consequences. Since the arguments should serve for an ex-ante qualification of actions hitherto only planned or

considered (the assumption the schematic notion starts with) the permission to use these premises or, from the opponent's point of view, their acceptability, is dependent on the reliability of prognoses. Now the propositions used in prognoses typically are of the if-then-form ('If action A was performed *then* this or that will happen'), and it is part of what characterizes the logical usage of the 'if-then', one of its semantic features, say, that who claims a proposition of the form 'if p then q' is bound to accept every so-called weakening or dilution of the if-clause, e.g. 'if p and p* then q', with 'p*' for a sequence of (at least one) arbitrary, positive or negative clause. So, strictly speaking, the physician who prognoses 'If you take these pills *then* you will be cured in a few days' should either accept the logical consequence 'If you take these pills *and* consume some neutralising drugs *and* undertake lots of bodily exertion *then* you will be cured in a few days' or he should make his prognosis more detailed by excluding each parameter that could influence the effects of the medicine.

Beside the well known problems to define criteria for good or even correct scientific prognoses as they have been discussing for a long time in the philosophy of science, there are special problems in the case of SSAs: Looking again at the examples given above it becomes evident that one of the specific features of SSAs is that the prognosticated "horrible" consequence of the performance of the action in question consists of further actions, the performer of A himself or others or the whole society will perform in the future. And whereas the action that leads to the slippery slope at first sight seems to be harmless, the actions the slippery slope presumably leads to are either unacceptable either in themselves or again due to their consequences. But insofar the proponents of those arguments presuppose that the action in question as for instance the regulative linguistic action of a government will have some influence on others', for instance the scientists', behaviour; and whereas they hope at least that their own argumentative (linguistic) actions could have some influence on the government's behaviour, they should accept that regulating or arguing are more or less effective means to bring others to do what one wants them to do. Therefore prognosticating that the legalisation of cloning human stem cells will lead to a slippery slope that inevitably ends in full human cloning either means: *whatever else is regulated* it will lead on the slippery slope. But this culture-sceptic thesis would deny any sufficient influence of regulating on the society's and especially the researcher's future behaviour (seeing researchers as some kind of "research junkies" and society as a whole becoming more and more "decadent" if not restrained by clear-cut limits) it is not only empirically questionable but inconsistent with the proponents' own argumentative behaviour. Or this prognosis means more precisely: *if nothing else is regulated* legislating the cloning of human stem cells will lead to the slippery slope – and then the argument will be helpful in the heuristics of appropriate formulations of norms demonstrating that cloning human

stem cells better would not be legalised without putting serious normative obstacles before any further step or – more precisely – the first step that is going too far. But certainly, finding out which formulation of norms would have the appropriate effects is not just a task that could be done adequately out of the ethicist's armchair, but it is – at least in cases of common interest as are those cited in the examples above – a complex task in the case of which trained competences in assessing the hypothetical effects of projected legislation are needed.

Dr. phil. Georg Kamp is member of staff at the Europäische Akademie. He is the coordinator of the study group "Practical Philosophy" and the managing editor of the international and trans-disciplinary journal *POIESIS & PRAXIS*.

Working groups

Climate Prediction and Climate Precautions

On May 6th, 2002 the Europäische Akademie's project group "Climate Prediction and Climate Precautions" will present its final report to the public at the "Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften" in Berlin. The aim of the study was to develop and evaluate the argumentations for an adequate acting under conditions of uncertainty on climate risks and limitations given by the principle of precaution. The report "Klimavorhersage und Klimavorwarnung" by Schröder et al. may be ordered at the Springer-Verlag (Berlin, Heidelberg) and will be available from May 6th onwards. An executive summary in English is currently prepared as one volume of the Graue Reihe of the Europäische Akademie and is to be expected early in May, too.

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TAMI

On February 28th and March 1st the Constitutional Meeting of TAMI (Technology Assessment in Europe; between Impact and Method) took place in the Houses of Parliament in London.

The main objective of the two year EU-project is to create and promote a structured dialogue within the community of Technology Assessment as well as between TA experts and policymakers. Nine leading TA institutions in Europe are participating in TAMI which is co-ordinated by the Europäische Akademie: Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), UK; Institute for Technology Assessment and System Analysis (ITAS), Germany; Office of Technology Assessment at the German Parliament (TAB), Germany; Academy for Technology Assessment in Baden-Württemberg (CTA), Germany; Danish Board of Technology (TEKNO), Denmark; Centre for Science and Technology Studies (TA Centre), Switzerland; Centre

of Science, Technology and Society Studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences (STS Centre), Czech Republic; The Warsaw School of Economics (SHG) – Institute of Modern Civilisation (IPWC), Poland; The Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Spain.

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Conferences

Frühjahrstagung 2002:

Nachhaltige Entwicklung und Innovation. Globale Perspektiven wirtschaftlichen Handelns

Zum Thema "Nachhaltige Entwicklung und Innovation. Globale Perspektiven wirtschaftlichen Handelns" veranstaltete die Europäische Akademie am 14. und 15. März in Bad Neuenahr ihre jährliche Frühjahrstagung. Im Mittelpunkt der wissenschaftlichen Tagung standen die Begriffe 'nachhaltige Entwicklung' und 'Innovation': Diese Leitbegriffe zeitgemäßer Umwelt- bzw. Wirtschaftspolitik scheinen auf den ersten Blick einen Gegensatz darzustellen: die Forderung nach nachhaltiger Entwicklung verhindert Innovationen; Innovationen – als Motor wirtschaftlicher Weiterentwicklung – verhindern eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Ob dieses Bild der Realität standhält, wurde auf der Tagung verhandelt. Professor Dr. Carl Friedrich Gethmann, Direktor der Akademie, stellte im Rahmen seiner Einführung die These auf, dass die Begriffe vielmehr in ein Verhältnis gegenseitiger Ergänzung gesetzt werden müssen: Ohne Innovationen ist an eine nachhaltige Entwicklung nicht zu denken; die Ausrichtung von Innovationen auf eine nachhaltige Entwicklung verbessert deren Wertschöpfungspotential. Nach Meinung von Professor Gethmann sei eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben der Tagung, das Zusammenspiel von Innovation und nachhaltiger Entwicklung in spezifischen Anwendungsfeldern zu klären.

Professor Dr. Cornelis Blok, Utrecht, nahm die so formulierte Herausforderung für den Energiebereich auf und stellte mehrere Möglichkeiten der Entwicklung des Energiebedarfs und Techniken der Bedarfsdeckung dar. Eine Reduktion der Verwendung fossiler Energiequellen und ein Ausbau regenerativer Energiequellen sei wirtschaftlich nur machbar, wenn der Energiebedarf insgesamt durch Effizienzsteigerungen beim Energieverbrauch zurückgeführt wird. Es sei möglich, diese Steigerungen in den maßgeblichen Bereichen der Industrie, des Wohnungsbereiches und der Mobilität mit heute zur Verfügung stehenden Techniken zu erreichen. Probleme sah Blok in der Aktivierung bestehender Potentiale.

Aus unternehmerischer Sicht ist das Zusam-

menspiel von Innovation und nachhaltiger Entwicklung längst Realität. Dr. Dieter Jahn, BASF AG, schilderte den in den vergangenen zehn Jahren vollzogenen Umbau des Unternehmens zu einem auch im Hinblick auf Nachhaltigkeit führenden "global player". Entscheidend seien für das Chemieunternehmen eine ständige Verbesserung der chemischen Prozesse im Hinblick auf die Ausbeute, also die Menge an Produkt, die eine chemische Reaktion ergibt.

Dr. Christian Schneller von der E.ON Energie AG problematisierte die Ersetzung der auslaufenden Kernkraftkapazitäten. Ein Ersatz durch regenerative Energietechniken könne zu schwer überwindbaren Problemen führen: Vor allem bei der Wirtschaftlichkeit dieser Techniken gäbe es Defizite. Dipl.-Ing. Heinz-Jörg Brecker von der Vaillant GmbH erläuterte den Innovationsprozess im Hause Vaillant. Kern dieses Prozesses ist die Annahme, dass Innovationen planbar sind, sobald eine Vision für ein Produkt entwickelt wurde. Diesen Prozess schilderte er beispielhaft an der inzwischen seriereifen Brennstoffzelle für die Energieversorgung von Mehrfamilienhäusern.

Professor Gethmann wies abschließend auf die Studie hin, die im Herbst 2002 als Ergebnis der Projektgruppe "Nachhaltige Entwicklung und Innovation im Energiebereich" der Europäischen Akademie GmbH erscheinen wird. Die Projektgruppe wird von Professor Dr. Ulrich Steger geleitet, der am IMD in Lausanne Umweltmanagement lehrt.

Weitere Referenten der Tagung waren: Professor Dr. Ulrich Steger (Nachhaltige Entwicklung und Innovation in einer globalisierten Wirtschaft); Professor Dr. Dieter Imboden, ETH Zürich (Die Beurteilung von Energiesystemen), Professor Dr. Hans G. Nutzinger, Kassel, und Professor Dr. Rudi Kurz, Pforzheim (Nachhaltige Innovationen. Eine Restriktion als Chance für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung), Professor Dr. Walter Frenz, Aachen (Das Recht nachhaltiger Innovationen).

News

Welcome

The Europäische Akademie welcomes Ulrike Henckel, Dipl. Päd., who started to work for the Europäische Akademie in January 2002. She is involved in the preparations for a new project of postgraduate medical education in 'ethics of medicine'. After having finished her studies in pedagogic, psychology and sociology at the University of Cologne, she studied Philosophy at the FernUniversität Hagen. Now Ulrike Henckel is working on her dissertation on anthropological basics of medical ethics.

Since the beginning of this year the Europäische Akademie has employed Dott. Rupert Leitner who is writing his dissertation on the problem of ignorance of possible consequences in the evaluation process of technology innovation options. After having completed his studies of Business Administration and Economics at the Universität

Commerciale "L. Bocconi" in Milan with a thesis on the recycling problem of complex mass products, Dott. Leitner joined the Fachhochschule Merseburg as a lecturer. Contemporarily he studied philosophy, sociology and psychology at the FernUniversität Hagen. Before he came to Ahrweiler, he had been working for a major international consulting firm in Hamburg.

ITA-Gesprächskreis

The ITA-Gesprächskreis (ITA = Innovation- and Technology Assessment) took place at the Europäische Akademie on March 7th and 8th. It is organized by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research in order to bring together the main actors of Technology Assessment in Germany. The topic of this meeting was "Interdisciplinarity/Transdisciplinarity". Lectures were presented by Dr. M. Decker, Professor Dr. A. Knie, Professor Dr. J. Mittelstraß, Professor Dr. C.F. Gethmann, Professor Dr. K. Pinkau, Professor Dr. W. Rammert.

Book Series

The following volumes of the Europäische Akademie's book series "Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung" were published recently:

P. Janich, M. Gutmann, K. Prieß (Hrsg.): Biodiversität. Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Relevanz. Band 10, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 2001, ISBN 3-540-42658-2.

M Decker (ed): Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment. Implementation and its Chances and Limits. Band 11, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 2001, ISBN 3-540-42792-9.

Lectures

Michael Decker:

30.1.2002 "Robotik. Perspektiven für menschliches Handeln in der zukünftigen Gesellschaft – Eine Technikfolgenbeurteilung", Forum Philosophicum der Fernuniversität Hagen

5.2.2002 "Technikfolgenbeurteilung der Robotik. Eine interdisziplinäre Unternehmung", VDMA, Fachabteilung Robotik, Frankfurt

8.3.2002 "Qualitätssicherung in der interdisziplinären Forschung", Gesprächskreis Innovative Technikfolgenabschätzung des BMBF, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler

Carl Friedrich Gethmann:

28.2.2002 "Ethische Probleme des reproduktiven Klonens", Disputation mit Ludger Honnefelder, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften

7.3.2002 "Der Alltag der Interdisziplinarität. Skizze eines Praxisberichts", Gesprächskreis Innovative Technikfolgenabschätzung des BMBF (Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler)

Stephan Lingner:

22. 2.2002 "Expertendiskurse. Erfahrungen aus einem interdisziplinären Klimaprojekt", Workshop "Normativität und Unsicherheit" (Universität Stuttgart).

Jeantine Lunshof:

22.11.2001 "Die Regelung der Euthanasie in den Niederlanden", Ringvorlesung "Der sterbenskranke Patient", Universitätsklinikum der Charité der Humboldt Universität, Berlin

10.3.2002 "Sterbehilfe in den Niederlanden", Rundfunkinterview, Medio-Radio, Hessen

15.3.2002 "Sterbehilfe – Tod nach Plan?", Podiumsdiskussion, Arbeitskreis Christlicher Kirchen, Marburg

Felix Thiele:

13.1.2002 "Ethik und Politik", Runder Tisch während der Veranstaltung "Für Europäische Grundwerte in der Bioethik" 11.-13. 1.2002, Berlin-Brandenburgisches Institut für Deutsch-Französische Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Genshagen

5.2.2002 "Der gläserne Mensch", Wissenschaft in der Gesellschaft. Runder Tisch während der Prager Wissenschaftsgespräche 4.-5.2.2002 Goethe Institut Prag

New Publications

M. Decker:

(in cooperation with A. Grunwald) "Rational Technology Assessment as Interdisciplinary Research", in: M. Decker (ed.) *Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment. Implementation and its Chances and Limits*. Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung Band 11, Berlin, 2001, 33–60

C. F. Gethmann:

(in cooperation with F. Thiele) "Ethical Arguments against the Cloning of Humans", in: *POIESIS & PRAXIS* 1 (2002), 35–46

"Participatory Technology Assessment. Some Critical Questions", in: M. Decker (ed.) *Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment. Implementation and its Chances and Limits*. Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung Band 11, Berlin, 2001, 3–13

(in cooperation with T. Sander) "Anti-Mentalismus", in: M. Gutmann et al. (Hrsg.), *Kultur – Handlung – Wissenschaft*. Für Peter Janich, Weilerswist 2002, 91–108

"Klimavorhersage und -vorsorge", Interview mit Professor Dr. C. F. Gethmann, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, und Professor G. Klepper, Kiel, in: *Energiemittelwirtschaftliche Tagesfragen* 52 (2002), Heft 1–2, 94 f

J. Lunshof:

"Bleibt die Menschenwürde auf der Strecke?", Statement, in: *Ware Mensch? – Der menschliche Embryo als Objekt der Begierde*. Institut für Kirche und Gesellschaft, Iserlohn, 2001, 111–112

F. Thiele:

"2002 Who should be the principal agent in microallocation? – Ethical comment on Horvath", in: F. Dietrich, H. Kliemt, M. Imhoff (eds.) *Micro-Allocation of Medical Resources. Economics and Ethics*. München, 44–47

Personalities



Dagfinn Føllesdal studied science and mathematics in Oslo and Göttingen and worked in ionospheric physics for two years before he went to Harvard in 1957 to study philosophy with Quine. After his Ph.D. at Harvard in 1961 he taught there until 1964, when he returned to his native Norway with a Santayana Fellowship. Since 1967 he has been a full professor in Oslo and since 1968 also in Stanford where he became C.I. Lewis Professor of Philosophy in 1976. Visiting professorships brought him to several universities in Europe, New Zealand, and the United States. He is laureate of the University of Oslo Research Prize and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Research Prize. Dagfinn Føllesdal is a member of many academies of science in Europe and the United States and he also was the President of the Norwegian Academy of Science in 1993, 1995 and 1997. Furthermore, he is a member of the editorial board of the Europäische Akademie's new journal *POIESIS & PRAXIS*.

In his works he mainly examines the possibilities of an approach between phenomenology and analytical philosophy, following the tradition of Frege, Husserl and Quine. His reflections on these topics together with his works on theory of action, ethics and philosophy of science have been published in more than 15 books and 150 articles. Presently he is working on an examination of the concept of risk.

Dagfinn Føllesdal is a member of the Europäische Akademie's project group "Environmental standards. Dose effect relations in the low dose range and their risk evaluation".

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